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THE INTERSECTION OF NATURAL RIGHTS
AND POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Randy E. Barnett*

I

N his article, Constitutional PositivisiJl/ Fred Schauer makes a
number of intriguing observations about the possible relevance of
natural law to constitutional adjudication. He identifies the natural law
position as holding that
law itself, just like the content of many laws, is derived from
fundamental conceptions of morality. As a result, legal systems (and perhaps even particular laws) unfaithful to those
moral conceptions are exemplars of erroneous derivations from
first moral principles and are therefore not genuinely legal at
all. 2
Against this view stands legal positivism which holds that
laws and legal systems satisfying certain sociological criteria
count as laws and legal systems, regardless of their moral content. Hence the central positivist claim [is] . . . that the existence of law is conceptually distinct from its moral worth. 3
As a conceptual description of law, Professor Schauer endorses constitutional positivism," although he in no manner denies that moral reasoning might be relevant to adjudication in some legal system or even
every existing legal system.
In this brief essay, I wish to describe what I see to be the unavoidable connection between natural law--or, more accurately, natural
rights-and the positive law that is the subject of constitutional adjudi* Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L REV 797 (1993).
2. ld. at 799.
3. ld. at 800-01.
4. Elsewhere he identifies his position as "presumptive posith·ism." See Frederick Schauer,
Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 645, 674-79 (1991).
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cation. This connection would exist whether or not there is a conceptual
distinction between natural and positive law of the sort that Schauer
maintains. Because of this connection, judges in a world in which legal
positivism is "true" should act, on occasion, as though the natural
rights approach is' correct. And if this is true then, I maintain, the nat·
ural rights position, in some important sense, is correct. Finally, I will
take issue with Professor Schauer's intimation that the appropriate do·
main of moral reasoning is limited largely to constitutional adjudica·
tion and to the Supreme Court of the United States. 5
I. THE MORAL IMPLICATION OF A PERCEIVED DUTY TO OBEY THE
LAW

My thesis is really quite simple. While it may be true-as Profes·
sor Schauer argues-that we can distinguish conceptually between
what the law "is" and what it "ought to be," between "law," on the
one hand, and "justice," on the other,6 this distinction establishes less
5. Because Professor Schauer offers so much of his analysis as suggestive and concludes that
"[t]here are no answers here," my thesis may not actually be inconsistent with his claims. But I
think it is inconsistent with at least some of the impressions his presentation evokes.
6. Dworkin's criticism of this central claim of positivism is considered by Schauer. He rc·
sponds that:
If Dworkin is right . . . the only hope for those who would be morally disturbed by the
results that Justice Thomas would reach is to try to get better judges, for the task of
trying to get Justice Thomas to lower his moral sights by focusing only on some pula·
tively narrower range of materials is, as a descriptive matter, a complete nonstarter.
Schauer, supra note I, at 824. In his later writings, however, Dworkin has made clear that he
limits the range of interpretation to that which is "internal" to the particular legal system in
question. That is, Hercules does not attempt to enforce only just laws, but to lind interpretations
of the law that would make it the best law it can be in light of all other decisions, statutes and
other authoritative legal pronouncements. In sum, Hercules' task is to rationalize the authoritative
legal directives from within his legal universe. Having accomplished this Hercules has stated what
the law "is." Nonetheless, this law-even so interpreted-may still be unjust.
So while I may agree with Schauer that "the constitutional positivist can study and identify
constitutional law as such without approving of it morally, and without feeling any part of the
enterprise," id. at 806, I agree with Dworkin that to do constitutional law even a positivist must
learn how to think as though he believed in the constitutional enterprise.
Schauer himself attributes something like this internal point of view to constitutional scholars
and particularly natural law scholars when he asserts that "the typical American constitutionalist
thinks that the American constitutional tradition is generally worthy," id, at 805, and that "there
is a tendency from a natural constitutional law perspective to think that a good deal of the Ameri·
can constitutional tradition has been morally tested and found worthy." /d. To the contrary, natural law-and especially natural rights-thinking has always been primarily a radical philosophy
and for that reason opposed. See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, In THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489, 49 I -94 (John Bowring ed., 1962) ( 1838). The basic conservatism of the
American judiciary has led it to reject, not embrace, natural law as positing a "brooding omni·
presence in the sky." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 {1917) (Holmes, J.,
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than meets the eye. To understand why, we must consider an interpretation of the natural law-positivist debate that nowadays is dismissed as
mundane: "that the natural law position is merely a claim about language and about the criteria for proper use of the word 'law'... ." 1
Though this semantic interpretation of the natural law-positivist debate
may be well known and boring, it has a significant moral implication
that is widely overlooked. This implication derives from the widespread
belief tha_t there is at least a prima facie moral duty to obey the law.
While modern legal positivists may deny-as they must if they
wish to preserve the value-neutral use of the term "law"-that there is
such a duty of obedience, this denial is simply beside the point. For, so
long as speaker and listeners both believe that law carries with it at
least a prima facie duty of obedience-that law qua law binds in conscience-then how we use or define the term law is not an arbitrary or
value-free matter. The conclusion that a particular course of action is
required by law will carry with it the perception that this action is, in a
real sense, morally obligatory-at least prima facie.
Schauer himself professes neutrality about the issue. He asserts
that "nothing about legal positivism entails any attitude whatsoever
about obedience to law." 8 This claim holds, however, only if law is a
strictly value-neutral concept. Only then would the mere fact that
something is a valid law carry with it no duty of obedience. When,
however, the popular perception that law does carry with it a duty of
obedience is taken into account, then asking what counts as law, and
thus as binding law (as opposed to positivist law simpliciter), is no
longer a value-neutral inquiry.
Consider this example: A duly enacted statute requires that people
own, possess, and are proficient with handguns. 9 If the fact that this
statute was duly enacted says nothing about whether a citizen is bound
in conscience to obey it, as Schauer maintains, then the positivists are
correct in asserting both the conceptual and operational separation of
law and justice. If, on the other hand, the fact that this statute was
duly enacted means in the relevant community of discourse that people
"ought" to obey it, then, at least prima facie, a person would be
dissenting).
7. Schauer, supra note 1, at 799 (emphasis added).
8. /d. at 806 n.18.
9. Cf. Alaska Votes to Bar Towns from Regulating Guns, NY TIMES, June 6, 1982, § I, at
27 (describing Kennesaw, Georgia's ordinance requiring a head of household to own and maintain
a firearm).
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thought to be acting wrongly not to do so and, significantly, it may then
be considered justified to coerce this person to so act.
Thus, in a particular community of discourse, the positive meaning
of a statute is not limited to what actions it directs (e.g., "own, possess,
and be proficient with a handgun"), but implicitly includes the further
proposition that "one has a moral obligation (at least prima facie) to
own, possess, and be proficient with a handgun and can be sanctioned
justly for disobedience." Consequently, as an operational matter,
we-meaning both participants in and those observing the legal system
in question-must ask whether this further proposition is true.
If some person-say a sheriff-files a complaint and seeks legal
sanctions10 against a person who has failed to possess a handgun, is this
complaint valid? More specifically, is it valid merely because the alleged conduct violates a legally enacted statute? Or must considerations of justice or rights be brought to bear so as to decide whether it is
in fact justified to coerce a person to perform these actions? Positivists
cannot use the term "law" both ways. 11
If this example appears farfetched, there may be a tendency to
dismiss it as something of a throw-back to the old debates about
whether Nazi-inspired German law was really law. Today, these debates may seem limited to extreme or radically pathological legal situations, and consequently they are sometimes said to teach us little about
law in basically just legal systems. But in formulating this hypothetical
statute I really had a far from farfetched example in mind: drug
prohibition.
Is it morally justified to send someone to the penitentiary or to
seize all her assets (and possibly to kill her for resisting any such ef10. I use the term sanction, because I wish not to limit the category of forcibly extracted legal
relief to punishment. Monetary damages and injunctive relief raise the same type of moral
questions.
11. Although natural law theorists can and do. When Aquinas questions whether an unjust
law is really a law, he is perfectly willing to identify the subject of this inquiry as a "law" for
purposes of determining whether it is a law. See Thpmas Aquinas, On Natural Law, In READINGS
IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3, 7 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 1984) ("Human Jaw has the
nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason . . . . But in so far as it deviates from reason,
it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law, but of violence."). For a natural law
theorist, the difference between a "law" and a law is that the latter binds in conscience while the
former does not. See id. at II ("Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just,
they have the power of binding in conscience . . . ."). Other legal cultures have it easier. They
have one word that is limited to enacted rules (e.g., Gesetz, /oi, ley, zakon, torveny) and another
that also includes principles of justice (e.g., Recht, droit, derecho, prava, jog). See George P.
Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 980-82 (1981).
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forts) for possessing or selling marijuana or cocaine solely because
these drug "laws" have been properly enacted? (Was it just to do the
same to people who brewed beer or distilled whiskey during the first
prohibition?) Apparently, many people believe that laws should be
obeyed. Else why would the many persons who think that criminalizing
drugs-marijuana in particular-is such a bad idea stand by so quietly
as today's heretics12-drug users-are herded into the brutality of
modern prisons? They acquiesce because "the law" is doing it.
Suppose the home of a person who grows large quantities of marijuana for sale is invaded by armed robbers who attempt to seize the
grower's cash. Would the illegal grower be justified in forcibly resisting
the invasion? Of course. Now suppose that this same home is invaded
by armed D.E.A. agents who attempt to seize the cash, the marijuana,
and the grower herself. Would she be justified in forcibly resisting the
invasion? Most believe and would answer "of course not." Should
D.E.A. agents be killed by a grower defending herself, she would be
prosecuted for murder and no one would object.13 Why not? For many,
the answer is that the agents were operating "under color of law."
If all this is correct, then despite the fact that we can distinguish
conceptually between the law and morals-between the requirements
of the Controlled Substances Act and its justice-it is not true that the
term "law" is used in a morally neutral way. In fact, the term "law" is
used precisely to decide that the marijuana grower is not a victim of
injustice whose rights have been violated but is instead a murderer who
has violated the rights of another. If so, then deciding what to call a
law is also not a morally neutral activity. If the label law is to engender
so serious a consequence, then at some point in the labeling process,
justice or rights must be taken into account before a decision that some
enactment is a genuine law is made. Before we conclude that an enactment is a law that persons may be killed to enforce, we require nothing
less than a reliable institutional defense of that law as just.14 And this
12. See GEORGE H. SMITH, ATHEISM. AYN RAND. AND OTHER HERESIES 233 (1991) (COmp3ring the punishment of drug users with Augustine's doctrine of "righteous persecution" that was
used by the Spanish Inquisition to punish Christian heretics).
13. While this commentary was being edited, this hypothetical was brought to life by the
Texas gun fight between agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tob:leco and Firearms and the Branch
Davidian religious £ect (or "cult" if we wish to express our disapproval). Very few (outside of
Texas) have asked whether the law the A.T.F. agents were attempting to enforce \vas just or even
whether it had actually been violated.
14. So while it may be true as a conceptual matter that "one whose job p3rtly involves law
application could do that part of the job without having to engage in any moral reasoning whatsoever," ScJtauer, supra note 1, at 802, and that "positivist judges, were they so inclined, could in
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is where natural rights meet constitutional adjudication.
II.

ENFORCING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF LEGITIMACY

For nearly everyone, the fact that a particular item of food-say a
sausage-is offered for sale means that it is wholesome. 11; Merely offering the sausage for sale is an assertion made by the seller that it is free
from disease, unless the seller makes some expression to the contrary.
The Uniform Commercial Code reflects this conventional understanding by implying in every contract of sale a warranty of
merchantability. 16
The implication of the analysis of Part I was that by offering an
enactment as a "law," a legal system is impliedly warranting the
merchantability of the enactment. "Merchantability" in this context
means that the law is sufficiently consistent with justice so as to create
a prima facie duty of obedience in the citizenry. This duty of obedience
means both that citizens are bound in conscience to obey the law and
that they may be coerced to some extent to secure their obedience or
punished for their disobedience.
Of course this implicit assertion could be denied. A legislature
could attach a rider to its enactment saying that "this statute does not
create any duty of obedience in the citizenry. Nor does its enactment
actually justify the use of force to secure compliance with its dictates."
That legislation carries no such expressed disclaimer and that such a
disclaimer would be considered absurd/ 7 underscores the power of the
some systems get away with an amoral conception of their task," id., we may well ask what
exactly these jurists have accomplished when they apply positive law in this amoral way. We know
that, by their own admission,- they have done nothing to suggest that the laws they arc applying
are just.
IS. By wholesome, I mean only that a sausage is fresh and untainted by disease. I am not
suggesting that eating sausages is good for one's health or that grocers implicitly warrant that this
is true.
·
16. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1990):
Unless excluded or modified . . ., a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on
the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
Of course, the imposition of such a warranty on every seller who does not expressly disclaim it
does more than impute to the seller an assertion that the goods in question are fit for the purpose
for which they are expected to be used. It also imputes to the seller an assumption of legal respon·
sibility should this fail to be the case.
17. Even so-called nonbinding "resolutions" are passed by Congress precisely because it is
thought ihat their enactment does create a duty of obedience even if it does not justify enforce·
ment of this duty. The whole point behind the passage of nonbinding resolutions is to provide a
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implied warranty of legitimacy or justice created by every enactment.
In this regard, the controversy between positivists and natural law
theorists can be conceived as a truth-in-labeling debate. Natural law
theorists accuse positivists of "bait-and-switch." What we label a law is
supposed to be strictly value-neutral, until the U.S. Marshals order you
to "open up in the name of the law" and then beat down your door
with a sledgehammer. Only then do we discover that purportedly valueneutral enactments have been replaced with official commands that one
supposedly has a moral duty to obey.
But whence comes this legitimacy? Let us consider sausages. Consumers do not themselves inspect for wholesomeness each sausage they
purchase. Nor, if they ever stopped to consider the matter, do they really believe that each and every sausage is inspected by the manufacturer or by health officials. Rather the tacit belief is that the process by
which sausages are made is such as to produce sausages that are free of
contamination. And this process includes both procedures for making
sausages and periodic inspections of some sausages so produced to see
if the procedures are being followed.
In the case of food, the tacit assertion by the seller is probably
something like the following: "By offering these sausages for sale, I
assert that I have purchased them from a reputable manufacturer who
in turn has tacitly asserted to me that it uses procedures that are adequate to assure that virtually every sausage produced is suitable for
human consumption." Similarly, a legal system is asserting the following about its enactments: "By offering this enactment for consumption
and adherence by citizens, and by authorizing officials to use force to
compel obedience to its requirements and to apprehend and punish
those who fail to comply, we assert that the process by which this enactment was made is adequate to assure that virtually every enactment
produced is just."
Of course, both of these assertions could be accepted on faith. Indeed they are. Most people neither kn9w nor care to know how sausages or how laws are made. But it is perfectly appropriate to ask in
each case whether the assertions are, in fact, true. Are the procedures
followed by the sausage manufacturer such that wholesome sausages
are the invariable result? Are the procedures followed by the legal system such that just laws are the invariable result? Or to relax the severity of the assertion a bit: Are the procedures followed by the legal sysmoral reason for someol}e to act as the legislature would wish.
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tern reliable enough to justify the presumption of legitimacy that
attaches to what is labeled "law"? Of course, this question is inherently
constitutional (with a small "c"). 18
At this juncture in the discussion, two schools of American constitutional thought emerge. Judicial skeptics-sometimes called judicial
conservatives-believe that the processes followed by the legislative and
executive branches-including, importantly, the fact that members of
both are popularly elected-are sufficient to engender confidence in
whatever emerges from the process and that judicial review is unlikely
to improve upon this process. In sum, as compared with the institutional alternatives, when it comes to making just laws, in legislatures
they trust.
Legislative skeptics-sometimes misleadingly called judicial activists-believe in a principle that, in another context, has been phrased
"trust, but verify." That is, while some deference may be due to the
process that produces enactments, we know enough about the tremendous weaknesses of these processes-including the weaknesses of popularly-elected representative government (as distinct from "democracy")19-to require that when challenged the outcomes of these
processes be reviewed to see if they are truly wholesome or just. While
legislative skeptics may trust the legislative process enough to allocate
to it the responsibility to initiate and draft the enactments that may
eventually bind as laws, they do not think we are justified in labeling
legislative enactments "laws"-with all that term connotes in this community of discourse-until a meaningful examination for wholesomeness is conducted by some other institution that is less affected by the
18. This question also accepts Schauer's view that the telling issue separating theorists may be
not whether there are such things as natural rights, but whether "empowering the judiciary to
locate and enforce them will produce a morally worse state than declining to so empower the
judiciary." Schauer, supra note I, at 819-20. This debate can be located within the liberal conception of the rule of law.
19. Schauer provides a graphic example of this weakness in his characterization of the public
deliberation over the role of the judiciary raised by the published speeches of Clarence Thomas:
(P]ublic debate about natural law and its relationship to constitutional theory was likely
to be as fruitful as a discussion of quantum physics on Larry King Live. Against the
background noise of grinding axes, soundbites replaced analysis, inflammatory examples
substituted for argument, and there was little concern about inconsistencies between the
rhetoric deployed against Thomas and that deployed against Judge Bork only four years
earlier.
/d. at 797. Legislative skeptics would expect as much. The only aspect of the legislative process
that works less well are deliberations that are out of public view in which interest group influence
can have free rein.
·
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problems of interest20 that we know to be pervasive in the legislative
arena.
Legislative skeptics view courts as performing this function, not
because they especially trust judges or because courts are perfect or
unaffected by interest,21 but because, for many well-known institutional
reasons, they are superior enough to legislatures to provide some independent assessment of legitimacy. And, for better or worse, in our hierarchical monopolistic legal system, courts are the only institution available to perform this crucial function. 22
Thus, legislative skepticism accords to courts the responsibility of
assuring that the quality has gone in before the name "law" goes on.
This job includes both the herculean task of interpreting the meaning
of enactments so as to make them the best they can be, but also the
task of seeing if the "best" is good enough. That is, the courts should
assess whether even the best interpretation of an enactment is sufficient
to justify a prima facie duty of obedience in the citizenry and to justify
using coercion on those who fail to obey.
But what is the nature of this inquiry into legitimacy'? Does it
mean that every law must be morally right, in which case skepticism
that judges (or anyone else) can make such a moral assessment leads to
an attitude of strong deference to legislatures? It is at this juncture
that natural rights theory parts company from (at least some) natural
law theory.
Natural law can be viewed as encompassing all aspects of morality. That is, it entails an objective assessment of the propriety of all
human action. It distinguishes vice from virtue. Whether I should
waste my life gambling (or gamboling) or whether I should get an education and make something of myself is a question addressed by natural law. If all enforced law is to be evaluated from this perspective, as
most critics of a natural law approach assume,23 then two powerful objections immediately follow. First, courts are hopelessly incompetent,
20. Or that is affected by interests that arc less likely to produce unjust outcomes.
21. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
22. See Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Sor:iety: Part Two-Crime Prel·entlon
and the Legal Order, CR!M. JuST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1986, at 30 (describing the op:ration or
a hypothetical polycentric legal order).
23. Even Aquinas did not go this far in a statement with a decidedly modern, if not liberal,
ring:
Now human law is framed for the multitude of human beings, the majority of whom arc
not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the \irtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to
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even as compared with legislatures, to make such judgments. Second,
allowing government to make such judgments would lead to a totalitarian or, at the very least, to an illiberal society. It is safe to assert that
these two concerns motivate most criticisms of the idea that judges
should be allowed to take the natural law into their own hands when
reviewing legislation.
In contrast is the natural rights position. While this decidedly liberal approach grew out of the natural law tradition, it was and still
remains distinct from it. Whereas the natural law approach can be
characterized as the "morality of aspiration," the natural rights approach is' more aptly characterized as the "morality of duty." 24 More
precisely, natural rights theory deals not with the general morality of
individual conduct, but with the legal protections each person requires
to pursue happiness while living in society with others. Far from viewing individuals as atoms, the natural rights tradition views some persons as weaker than others and all individuals as invariably weaker
than the group.
Natural rights define the moral space within which persons must
be free to make their own choices and live their own lives. They are
rights insofar as they entail enforceable claims on other persons (including those who call themselves "government officials"). And they
are natural insofar as their necessity depends upon the (contingent)
nature of persons and the social and physical world in which persons
reside. 2 G
As is readily apparent, a natural rights approach is far less ambitious and moralistic than traditional natural law reasoning and consequently far less conducive to a totalitarian or illiberal, regime. Indeed,
natural rights are a necessary part of the antidote to such regimes. Yet •
a natural rights approach still would seem to be vulnerable to the
charge that judges are incompetent to discern exactly what are the natural rights of all persons.
Although I cannot fully respond to this concern here, let me begin
a response by outlining the method of analysis that I have only started
abstain; and chiefly those that are injurious to others, without the prohibition of which
human society could not be maintained. Thus human law prohibits murder, theft and the
like.
Aquinas, supra note II, at II (emphasis added).
24. See LON L. FULLER. THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-6 (1964) (distinguishing the two
moralities).
25. This dependence, however, does not mean that such rights are "presocial." To the con·
trary, rights are only needed when persons live in society with others.
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to develop elsewhere.26 This method is not, strictly speaking, a pure
natural rights approach to law,27 but rather is a natural rights approach to constitutional adjudication. This is fitting given that Professor Schauer's thesis concerns constitutional positivism.
In brief, natural rights define the moral jurisdiction of each person
to use certain physical resources (including her body) in the world.28
While these rights can be stated very abstractly, in practice they must
be determined or "posited" conventionally and, in our legal culture,
have been so determined by common law adjudicative processes.29
Thus, the common law principles of property, contract, tort, restitution,
and agency (this list is not exhaustive of potential categories) provide
the basic legal definitions of these natural rights. This is the work that
judges have been doing for centuries.
Some, but far from all, government enactments restrict the exercise of these "rightful" liberties. 30 That is, they tell someone that they
cannot engage in behavior that is otherwise rightful according to the
laws of contract, property, tort, etc. When they do, they may be viewed
26. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Consen·atism v. A Principled Judicial Acti,·ism, 10 HARV. J.L & PuB. PoL'Y 273 (1987); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of l.JJw, 14 HARV. J.L & PUB PoL'Y 615 (1991); Randy E.
Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED B\' TilE
PEOPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
1993).
27. See infra note 34.
28. I describe and begin to provide a functional defense of this conception of natural rights in
Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Se,·eral Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc PIIIL &
PoL'Y 62 (1992).
29. In this respect, Schauer provides a false dichotomy between a natural rights apprroch and
"legal positivism, according to which law is not deri,·ed necessarily from fundamental moral principles, but rather is simply 'posited' by human beings and human institutions." Schauer, supra
note I, at 799 (emphasis added). Under a natural rights appro:~ch, legal rules are not "derived
from" natural rights, but are derived by mean of normal techniques of legal reasoning. The conventional rules and principles that result from this reasoning arc then subjected to critical scrutiny
to see whether they are compatible with relatively abstract natural rights. In this way, judges (or
legislators) who respect natural rights must still "posit" the rules and principles we call law.
Legal positivism originally gained its name not from the fact that it acknowledged that law
was "posited"-a claim about human law that Aquinas, for example, would have readily acknowledged-but from John Austin's theory that the law owes its obligatory nature or legitimacy to the
"position" of the lawgiver as sovereign.
30. Of ceurse, many such liberty-restricting statutes enacted during the p:!St century purport
merely to codify or systemize these common law principles. How arc these clTorts to be distinguished from rights infringements? Addressing this important issue would take me too far afield.
Suffice it to say that most legislative interferences with liberty make no such claim. Instead they
claim to override, not refine, these principles.
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as "infringing" these persons' natural rights. 31 The fact of this infringement is morally significant in two ways.
First, it requires justification. That is, legislative will alone is not
enough to justify such infringement. Such exercises of will must be
both "necessary and proper" to the execution of some legitimate governmental power. To assure that such legislation is indeed necessary
and proper, the onus falls upon those seeking to exercise these powers,
when properly challenged, to show that they are in fact justified. And a
neutral magistrate must adjudicate the claims.
Second, when government sustains its burden of proving that a
rights infringement is both necessary and proper, natural rights do not
forever after evaporate. These rights are inalienable and remain always
in the background so that future claims of powers, as well as continued
use of powers approved in the past, must still be necessary and proper.
In sum, even when properly overridden, these rights are "retained by
the people." 32
According to this account, then, the existence of natural rights
both helps to set the baseline definition of rightful conduct and places
the onus of proof on those who would restrict the exercise of otherwise
rightful conduct. To identify the background rights requires no greater
talents of identification than are currently performed by judges in their
private law capacity. And it places the burden on advocates of legislation to generate proof that their acts are justified. Judges then merely
listen and evaluate what they hear.
So while Schauer is correct to ·claim that because "there are natural rights does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is the task
of particular officials to identify and enforce them," 33 there are institutional and, indeed, moral reasons why this conclusion may be warranted. Laws that violate the natural rights of a person do not bind that
person in conscience and do not justify the use of coercion against that
person unless it is shown that such exercises of power are necessary and
proper. 34 Thus the enterprise of labeling enactments. laws does lead, if
31. We may say that such enactments have violated natural rights as they have been defined
by positive Jaw, in which case we would be accepting the basic conceptual distinction between
natural rights and positive Jaw that is urged by Schauer.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
33. Schauer, supra note I, at 809.
34. The fact that inalienable natural rights can be infringed permissibly if the infringement is
shown to be both necessary and proper distinguishes this approach to constitutional adjudication
from a purely libertarian natural rights approach to law. With the latter, no infringement of
natural rights would be permissible.
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not inexorably then plausibly, to the claim that it is the moral duty of
each member of every branch of the lawmaking process, including
_courts, to scrutinize enactments purporting to be laws to see if they
have the "moral" or rights-respecting qualities that such laws must
have. And the more that legislators abstain from such scrutiny, the
greater becomes the responsibility of judges to do so.
If this is correct, then Schauer's suggested "irrelevance of much of
the traditional natural law /positivism debate to contemporary questions of constitutional interpretation"3G is either wrong or highly misleading.36 Moral inspection to ensure that natural rights have not been
violated is, in Schauer's words,· "necessarily part of every act of law
identification (and therefore of law application), [so that] one whose
job partly involves law application could not do that part without engaging in moral reasoning. " 37

III. How

LIMITED IS THE DOMAIN OF NATURAL RIGHTS IN
ADJUDICATION?

I am now in a position to address Professor Schauer's contention
that whatever inquiries into the justice of a law are warranted become
increasingly inapplicable "the further one moves away from the morally soaked subject of constitutional law, and the further one moves
away from (even within constitutional law) the Supreme Court of the
United States."38
Schauer claims that if moral reasoning by judges applies only
within the limited domain of constitutional law and then only within
the even more limited domain of Supreme Court adjudication, the distinction between law and justice that positivism advocates is descriptively important. Let us grant this point. Nonetheless, I think that the
35. Schauer, supra note 1, at 803.
36. As he himself points out immediately after the p3553ge quoted supra in the text accomp:lnying note 33, "at this point the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism returns to
the arena." Schauer, supra note I, at 809. Eltactly.
37. /d. at 802. By moral reasoning, I (though not Schauer) mean determining that natural
rights have not been unnecessarily or improperly infringed.
38. Id. at 824. He continues:
[I]f we think of the limited domain notion of law as treating text, precedent, and p1:rhaps
other authoritative materials as relatively distinct from other sources, then it is possible to
imagine that the indications of those sources could be taken as at least presumptively
controlling by some class of constitutional deeisionmakers. And it is possible that these
indications of law qua law would be more likely clearer for a larger p1:rcentage or decisions the further one gets from the Supreme Court.
/d. at 824-25 (footnote omitted).
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argument as presented understates the size of the domain in which law
and natural rights or justice intersect.
First, the intersection of law and justice is not limited to constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court. Every law that affects the
liberty of a citizen may potentially violate that citizen's natural rights.
Therefore, every assertion of legal jurisdiction over the life of a citizen
may be critically assessed. (by someone) to see whether this is a just or
an unjust interference with that citizen's rightful liberty. According to
the linkage between natural rights and constitutional adjudication I am
sketching here, whenever Congress enacts a statute that affects the liberty of a citizen and the President signs it, this law may be just or
unjust and an "independent tribunal[] of justice"39 should examine the
statute to see if it is consistent or inconsistent with the natural rights of
the citizen.
If the courts assume this role, then the inquiry will begin at the
district court level. Uriless the very same law has been upheld by the
Supreme Court (which is unlikely40 ) a district court judge is as obliged
to. consider the justice or rights question as the appellate court that
considers her opinion and the Supreme Court, which considers the appellate court's opinion. In sum, if Supreme Court justices should engage in this sort of analysis in constitutional adjudication with regard
to a federal statute, then so should every other federal judge. While
still limited, the domain in which law and natural rights intersect has
expanded.
Nor is the relevance of natural rights limited to the public law
domain of constitutional adjudication. As I have described it, within
constitutional adjudication judges must determine if the natural rights
of persons have been infringed by specific enactments. But this leaves
us with the obvious and difficult question, what are a person's natural
rights?
As I explained above, the distinction between rightful and wrongful conduct has traditionally been the subject of the private law of contract, property, tort, agency, restitution, etc. Reasoning within each of
39. I ANNALS OF CoNG. 439 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Madison). This phrase was used by Madison during his speech to the first House of Reprcscnta·
tives defending the efficacy of a bill of rights on the grounds that such tribunals "will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive." /d.
40. The likelihood changes when we consider state legislatures enacting statutes, e.g., death
penalty statutes, because such statutes of other states have been upheld previously by the Supreme
Court.
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these fields attempts to provide legal conceptualizations of abstract natural rights. Consequently, the legal rules and principles that emerge
from such private law adjudication can and should also be subject to
moral scrutiny.
For example, is imposing obligations to act or refrain from acting
on persons without their consent a violation of natural rights and consequently unjust?. Contract law principles generally counsel refraining
from such impositions, while tort law attempts to describe the circumstances when such impositions of obligation are not unjust.41 In this
way, common law adjudication of private law questions provides the
following legal baseline against which a statute's constitutionality is to
be assessed: has the statute restricted the rightful liberty of a citizen?
When setting this baseline too, judges must take justice into account.
So judges-primarily state court judges-must take justice or antecedent natural rights into account in the domain of private law. The
results. of this process provide a baseline in the constitutional domain
against which to assess when statutes are or are not infringing natural
rights. At that juncture, the justice and necessity of this infringement
of natural rights must then be assessed by state or federal judges. The
domain in which law and natural rights intersect has grown quite large
indeed.
What then is excluded? Any enactment that does not seck to limit
coercively the rightful liberty of a citizen, either because there is no
sanction attached to disobedience (a rare occurrence) or because the
statute concerns the dispensation of benefits (a common occurrence) or
because the statute regulates the internal operation of government itself42 (an even more common occurrence).
So in the end, although I maintain that the domain of inescapable
intersection between justice and law is a good deal larger than Schauer
intimates, I want to insist on the limited domain thesis myself. For, the
fact that judicial scrutiny of enactments for their conformity with
rights or justice is limited to those enactments that seek to restrict the
exercise of rightful liberty contributes to the practicality of authorizing
such scrutiny. It is simply not the case that such scrutiny would be
41. It is precisely for this reason that some who would exp:md greatly the numb:r of legal
obligations wish to eliminate the traditional distinction between contract and tort.
42. Where such statutes affect the liberty of persons they do so in the government's cap:~city
of either employer or property owner. While these categories are hardly self-evident. inviolate. or
unproblematic, they do represent a principled distinction between government regulation restrict·
ing rightful liberty and all other government enactments.
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made of all, or even of much, legislation. So we can safely authorize it
where it is both needed and appropriate. Moreover, the use of precedent by the Supreme Court and lower courts further reduces the need
for unfettered case-by-case analysis. Once stricken, a similar statute is
presumptively unconstitutional as well and the issue need not be considered de novo. 43
IV.

SUMMARY

The analysis presented here can be summarized in three sentences:
So long as obedience to law is perceived in some sense as obligatory,
the intersection between positive constitutional law and natural rights is
both crucial and unavoidable. And without some independent judicial
scrutiny to see that the requisite quality has gone into an enactment
before the name "law" goes on, the implied warranty of
merchantability that necessarily accompanies all enacted legislation is
but an empty and- irredeemable promise. Finally, though broader than
Professor Schauer intimates, the domain of this judicial scrutiny is still
limited to a subset of all governmental enactments or orders-the ones
that infringe a persons's rightful exercise of liberty.

43. For reasons pertaining to the presumption of liberty, I am more sympathetic with prece·
dent when finding statutes unconstitutional than when finding them constitutional.

